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The Criminal Evidence (N .1.) Order 1988: 
A Radical Departure from the Common 
Law Right to Silence in the U.K.? 
[The U.S.} Constitution is a kind of bottom line beneath which the Gov-
ernment cannot go. Here, there is no bottom line. 
British Solicitor Gareth Pierce! 
The critical point is that the Constitution places the right of silence beyond 
the reach of government. The Fifth Amendment stands between the 
citizen and his government. 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 454 (1956) 
(Douglas, j., dissenting). 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 1988, the British Parliament adopted the Criminal 
Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order (the Order).2 The Order, which 
applies exclusively to Northern Ireland, amends previous common 
law provisions governing criminal evidence. Specifically, the Order 
impacts the criminal suspect's so-called "right to silence" by allowing 
the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences from a suspect's refusal 
to answer questions at the pre-trial stage or refusal to testifY at trial. 
The confusion and controversy surrounding the implementation 
of the Order reflects the muddled state of British evidence law with 
regard to a criminal suspect's "right to silence." By examining the 
Order's impact on Northern Ireland in the context of the right's 
historical evolution and current status in British common law, this 
note attempts to address the questions central to this controversy. 
Part I presents an overview of British common law in this area prior 
to the introduction of the Order. Part II offers an analysis of the 
relevant U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the Fifth Amend-
ment, which serves as a model for the right to silence. Part III 
analyzes the Order itself, including the background leading up to 
IJeanne Bishop Clarizio, Criminal Justice in The Old Bailey, 30 N.H. BAR]. 79, 87. 
2 Andrew Ashworth & Peter Creighton, The Right of Silence in Northern Ireland, in LESSONS 
FROM NORTHERN IRELAND 117 (1990). 
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enactment and the manner in which it has affected criminal law in 
Northern Ireland following enactment. Part IV examines whether 
the Order has enacted substantive changes in the right to silence, 
and goes on to consider the right to silence in the broader context 
of the Fifth Amendment by analyzing the policy rationales for a 
limited "privilege" of silence and a protected "right" to silence. This 
Note concludes that because the right to silence at common law 
operates more like a privilege, the Order as currently utilized does 
not represent substantive change in the criminal evidence law of 
Northern Ireland. Moreover, because important policy rationales 
support a protected "right" to silence in an adversary system, the 
British concept of the right to silence should be reworked to more 
closely resemble the Fifth Amendment. 
1. AN OVERVIEW OF BRITISH EVIDENCE LAw: 
THE RIGHT To SILENCE 
A. Origins of Comrrwn Law "Right to Silence" 
Disputes over the nature of the "right to silence" itself at British 
common law have produced almost as much controversy and con-
fusion as have statutory restrictions on that right.3 British case law is 
rife with references to a criminal defendant's common law right to 
remain silent.4 Because the British legal system operates in the 
absence of a written constitution,S at common law that right has 
been characterized in different ways and interpreted to encompass 
different things.6 Examination of the historical evolution of the right 
3 See David Dixon, Politics, Research and Symbolism in Criminal Justice: The Right to Silence 
and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 20 ANGLO·AM. L. REV. 27 (1992); Stephen Greer, 
The Right to Silence: A Review of the Greer, 53 MOD. L. REv. 710 (1990); J.D. Jackson, Recent 
Developments in Criminal Evidence, 40 N. IRL. LEGAL Q. 105, 106 (1989). Additionally, because 
Northern Ireland has been a part of the United Kingdom since the 17th century, the Northern 
Irish courts are bound by British common law. See generally SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO 
SILENCE (1991). 
4 See, e.g., R. v. Lewis, [1973] 57 Crim. App. 860, 866; R. v. Hall, [1971] 1 All E.R. 322, 324; 
R. v. Bathurst, [1968] 2 Q.B. 99, 104. 
5 See Clarizio, supra note 1, at 87. The rights of British citizens derive from the historical 
notion of an unwritten constitution, and are considered "residual," in that individuals are 
permitted to do whatever is not prohibited by law. [d. (citation omitted). A famous restatement 
of this principle of an "unwritten constitution" can be found in Liverside v. Sir John Anderson: 
"[i]n the constitution of this country, there are no guaranteed or absolute rights. The 
safeguard of British liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of repre-
sentation and responsible government which has been evolved." [d. (citation omitted). 
6 In a recent civil case heard on appeal in the House of Lords, Lord Mustill noted that "[the 
right to silence] arouses strong but unfocused feelings. In truth it does not denote any single 
right, but rather refers to a disparate group of immunities, which differ in nature, origin, 
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at common law is essential to any understanding of its current 
status.' 
The origins of the right to silence in the common law are unclear.s 
Legal historians disagree as to the time period in which this right 
first surfaced, but the earliest formulation of what was to become 
the common law right to silence can be found in a Roman-canon 
law maxim, nerrw tenetur seipsum prodere ("no one is bound to betray 
himself').9 Traditional theories held that the right crept into the 
common law in the mid-seventeenth century, following the demise 
of the political courts of the Star Chamber and High Commission. lO 
This change represented a reaction against these institutions' re-
incidence and importance ... " Smith v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, [1992] 3 All E.R. 
456, 463-64. Lord Mustill went on to identify six "rights" contained within the concept of 
"right to silence," including a "special immunity ... possessed by accused persons undergoing 
trial, from having adverse comment made on any failure (a) to answer questions before the 
trial, or (b) to give evidence at the trial." Id. at 464. 
7 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Fifth Amendment 
Privilege of the Fifth Amendment, 55 IOWA L. REv. 829, 833-34 (1970). Justice Frankfurter, 
commenting on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, noted that "the 
privilege ... is a specific provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth 
a volume oflogic.'" Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956). 
8 Greer, supra note 3, at 710; see generally M.R.T. McNair, The Early Development of the 
Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 10 Ox.]. L. STUD. 66 (1990); L.w. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1986);].H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw 
(1980). 
9 McNair, supra note 8, at 70. 
10 Id. at 66; Greer, supra note 3, at 71 O. The Court of High Commission was an ecclesiastical 
court established by Queen Elizabeth II and designed to enforce religious conformity. 
Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in 
Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 73 (1988). Adopting inquisitorial procedures, 
including compelled interrogation upon the "oath ex officio," the Court became a powerful 
weapon in the prosecution of religious crime. Id. The oath became despised as a public symbol 
of the religious persecution institutionalized by the Court, for it placed accused heretics in 
the impossible dilemma of "either 'cutting one's throat with one's tongue' or suffering eternal 
damnation." Id. at 74 (quoting LEVY, supra note 8, at 330). More virulent opposition to the 
administration of the oath ex officio arose in the middle of the seventeenth century in another 
forum, the Court of Star Chamber. Id. Star Chamber was a criminal court and a tool of political 
oppression which gained infumy in the trial of John Lilburne in 1637. Id. at 75-76. Lilburne, 
charged with printing heretical and seditious books, refused to take the oath, asserting "before 
I swear, I will know to what I must swear." Id. at 76; see also Lane V. Sunderland, Self-Incrimi-
nation and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 
171, 174 (1979). Upon being interrogated, he denied the charges and refused to answer 
questions relating to other offenses, stating in part: "I know it is warrantable by the law of 
God, and I think by the law of the land, that I may stand upon my just defence and not answer 
to any of your interrogatories." Sunderland, supra, at 175 (quoting Trial of Lilburne & 
Wharton, 3 How. ST. TR. 1315 (1637-45). Lilburne was sentenced to prison for contempt, 
but his conviction was overturned by the House of Lords, which declared it in violation of 
individual liberty, the law of the land, and the Magna Carta. Id. The Lilburne case created 
great public outcry, and ultimately led to the abolition of the oath and the dismantling of 
both Star Chamber and High Commission. Id.; Benner, supra, at 77. 
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quirement of the accused's compulsory testimony upon oathY Re-
visionists have disputed this theory, and there is compelling histori-
cal evidence that the right against self-incrimination was derived 
from an array of values, both religious and secular.12 At some point 
during the nineteenth century, however, the notion that a criminal 
suspect should not be compelled to give evidence against himself, 
and in fact was privileged against doing so, became an accepted part 
of the common law.13 
The evolution of right to silence jurisprudence at common law is 
murky, characterized by seeming contradictions and a lack of pre-
cedential tradition. Indeed, in 1977 the Court of Appeal noted that 
it was impossible to reconcile all of the case law.14 It is clear, however 
that the right is not an absolute one. Although a criminal suspect is 
always entitled to refuse to answer police questions or even to testify 
at trial, there may be evidentiary consequences stemming from such 
a decision.l5 The problem lies in defining when and to what extent 
those consequences will arise. 
Early common law authorities recognized that there were prob-
lems inherent in allowing a criminal suspect to remain silent in the 
face of accusations. The major problem was self-evident: common 
sense would appear to dictate that the failure to answer an accusa-
tion, at a time when an answer could reasonably be expected, might 
provide some evidence in support of the accusation.16 The corollary 
of this maxim is that the natural reaction of the innocent suspect 
when confronted with an accusation is both vigorous denial and 
pointed assertion of innocenceP Jeremy Bentham, an influential 
nineteenth century legal scholar, succinctly synthesized these no-
tions in his famous dictum: "innocence claims the right of speaking, 
II [d. at 66; Greer, supra note 3, at 710. Objections to the oath were founded on historical 
disputes over ecclesiastical jurisdiction as well as vague notions of procedural fairness and 
individual dignity. See Sunderland, supra note 10, at 176-81. Jurist Sir Edward Coke was 
profoundly troubled by both the lack of specific charges brought against the accused in both 
courts as well as the matter of interrogation into the "secret thoughts of his heart, or of his 
secret opinion." [d. (quoting 0/ Oaths Be/are an Ecclesiastical Judge Ex Officio, 77 ENG. REP. 
1308 (K.B. 1607)). 
12 For discussions of revisionist theory and the policies that shaped the formation of the 
right against self-incrimination, see generally Greer, supra note 3, at 710-11; LEVY, supra note 
8; McNair, supra note 8; Benner, supra note 10; Sunderland, supra note 10, at 176-81. 
13 See Greer, supra note 3, at 710-11. 
14 R. v. Gilbert, [1977] 66 Crim. App. 237, 244; see also R. v. Mutch, [1973] 1 All E.R. 178, 
181 ("[i]n the circumstances ... there would be no point in reviewing the cases, some of 
which are not easy to reconcile .... "). 
15R. v. Chandler, [1976] 1 WL.R. 585, 589. 
16 David Wolchover, Guilt and the Silent Suspect, 139 NEW LJ. 306 (1989). 
17 [d. 
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as guilt invokes the privilege of silence."!8 Because the British judi-
ciary has been strongly influenced by this vein of thought, it has 
consistently interpreted the "right" as a privilege with certain inher-
en t limitations.!9 
From the earliest indication of the existence of the right at com-
mon law, the judiciary has reserved for itself a limitation on that 
right in the form of jury instructions. 2o The bench has historically 
asserted a right to comment upon a criminal suspect's silence in the 
face of accusation, or his failure to testifY at trial. At the same time, 
the prosecution has been prohibited from commenting on silence.2! 
The oft-cited comments of Lord Atkinson in R v. Christie, are the 
classic expression of this principle. Atkinson stated that although 
silence cannot be the justification for an automatic inference of 
guilt, the jury could decide whether a suspect's silence at the time 
of accusation amounted to an acceptance of that accusation in 
whole or in part.22 The idea that the judiciary may comment on the 
extent to which inferences can be made from a suspect's silence in 
the face of accusation is deeply ingrained in the common law. 23 
18 Greer, supra note 3, at 719. But see A.D.E. Lewis, Bentham's View of the Right of Silence, 43 
CURRo LEG. PROB. 135-57 (1990) (arguing that Bentham's views on the right to silence were 
misinterpreted historically). 
19 See Greer, supra note 3, at 710. 
20 See R. V. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77,83 Oudge under Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 has 
right to comment on failure of defendant to testity, the nature and degree of which rests 
entirely within judicial discretion). 
21 The 1898 Criminal Evidence Act expressly forbid prosecutorial comment upon a defen-
dant's assertion of the defendant's right to silence. See R. V. Wickham, [1971] 55 Crim. App. 
199,201-03. This prohibition is still good law, although the number of statutory and common 
law exceptions is growing. For example, where there is conflict in the evidence of two 
c<HI.efendants, counsel for one defendant has the right to comment on the fuilure of a 
c<HI.efendant to give evidence. Wickham, 55 Crim. App. at 199. Moreover, the bench has no 
discretion to limit such comment Id. 
22 R.v. Chandler, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 585, 588-589; R. V. Christie, [1914] App. Cas. 554, 554. 
23 In R V. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77, judicial comment on a defendant's silence was held to 
be a matter for the discretion of the trial court judge. See Mark Berger, Re-Thinking Self-In-
crimination Law in Great Britain, 61 DENVER L. J. 507, 540 n.216 (1984). The confusion lies 
in the permissible scope of this judicial comment. Id.; see also R. V. LittIeboy, [1934] 2 K.B. 
408,413-14 (''we do not think, however, that it was ever intended to lay down the proposition 
that ajudge may not, in a proper case, comment ... "); Chandler, 1 W.L.R. at 589 ("[t]he law 
has long accepted that an accused person is not bound to incriminate himself; but it does not 
follow that a failure to answer an accusation or question when an answer could reasonably be 
expected may not provide some evidence in support of an accusation. Whether it does will 
depend upon the circumstances."). In 1992, Lord Justice Dillon of the Court of Appeal 
commented that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is so deeply entrenched in our law 
that any decision to curtail it or not is essentially a political decision and a matter for 
Parliament" See Damien McCrystal, Silence is Golden, 142 NEW L.J. 154 (1992). 
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B. Scope and Substance of the Right at Common Law 
The extent to which judicial comment is allowed, and implicitly, 
the extent to which a suspect's silence may be used against him, is 
the subject of judicial confusion at the appellate level. 24 First of all, 
the scope of the right to silence must be determined from the facts 
of each individual case.25 The right to silence derives its strength 
from the general principle of British common law that the duty to 
answer police questions is a moral or social one, not one imposed 
by the law.26 Given the paradox of the existence of this principle and 
the countervailing notion that judges may comment at trial on 
silence in the face of accusation, the case law in this area is under-
standably inconsistent. There are, however, four factors which gen-
erally appear to influence the courts' determination of the bounda-
ries of judicial comment: (1) the type of inference which will be 
drawn from the instruction; (2) the stage in which the silence is 
manifested, either in pre-trial police interrogation or refusal to 
testify at trial; (3) the presence of a solicitor; and (4) whether the 
criminal suspect has been administered a "caution" regarding his 
right to remain silent.27 
1. Type of Inference 
The relationship between the silence and the type of inference to 
be drawn is the most easily recognizable factor used by the courts 
24Greer, supra note 3, at 713; see also Berger, supra note 23, at 541 ("the area appears to 
be one in which British commentators are reluctant to commit themselves to a statement of 
what the law purportedly is. "). For example, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held in 
1966 that it was clearly impermissible for the bench to comment to the effect that "because 
the accused exercised what is undoubtedly his right, the privilege of remaining silent, you 
may draw an inference of guilt." R. v. Ryan, [1966] 50 Crim. App. 144, 148. The court 
continued, however, that it was quite a different matter to say: "[t]his accused, as he was 
entitled to do, has not advanced at any earlier stage the explanation that has been offered to 
you today; You, the jury, may take that into account when you are assessing the weight that 
you think it right to attribute to the explanation." fd. Such a comment was deemed permis-
sible. 
In contrast, the same Court of Appeals just eleven years later expressed deep dissatisfaction 
with this distinction, noting that both instructions represented invitations to the jury to draw 
adverse inferences, though one may have been more oblique than the other. R. v. Gilbert, 
[1977] 66 Crim. App. 237, 244. Despite its discomfort with such a distinction, however, the 
court expressly declined to repudiate Ryan. See Gilbert, 66 Crim. App. at 244-45. 
25R. v. Chandler, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 585, 589 (whether [silence may provide evidence in 
support of an accusation] "will depend on the circumstances"); R. v. Raviraj, [1987] 85 Crim. 
App. 93, 103 ("each case must be considered on its own facts"). 
26 Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, 419. 
27 See infra notes 28-75 and accompanying text. 
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to determine the extent of judicial comment. Where judicial com-
ment equates silence at any time as evidence of an acknowledgment 
of guilt, the extent to which the bench may direct the jury to draw 
direct adverse inferences appears restricted.28 It is clear misdirection, 
and thus grounds for appeal, for a trial judge to suggest that silence 
is direct and convincing evidence of guilt,29 or that the only way in 
which an accused may give his interpretation of events is to testify.30 
Indeed, it appears that the more direct the asserted inference, the 
more likely the success of a defendant's appeal on grounds of mis-
direction.3! 
Where the type of inference to be drawn is more remote, however, 
as in the use of silence as bolstering inferences to be drawn from 
the prosecution's case, the extent of proper comment is subject to 
greater judicial discretion.32 There are two principal common law 
28 David Wolchover, From Silence to Guilt: The Belatedly Mentioned Fact, 139 NEW LJ. 428, 
428 (1989); see also R. v. Lewis, [1973] 57 Crim. App. 860, 867 (no justification for comment 
which is "immediately directed to the guilt or innocence of the accused"). 
29R. v. Sparrow, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 488, 492-93. In this case, the defendant refused to testifY 
at trial and was convicted of murdering a police officer. The disputed issue at trial related to 
the defendant's intent. In his "summing up" to the jury (jury instructions), the trial judge 
noted the failure to give evidence (testifY) six times, and stated that it was not enough for the 
defendant to rely on his counsel's eloquence, because giving evidence in a case of this kind 
was in fact essential. Id. at 492 ("it is not essential that he should go into the witness box 
himself ... and be subject to cross-examination about it. Well, he did not do so and there it 
is."). The Court of Appeal held that such strong comment would have been understood by 
the jury as an instruction that the defendant was guilty because he had not given evidence, 
but declined to quash the conviction. Id. at 493. 
30 R. v. Bathurst, [1968] 2 Q.B. 99, 106--08. In this case, a conviction for manslaughter was 
substituted for murder where ajudge commented on the defendant's refusal to give evidence 
in the following manner: "[i]t may help you to reflect that your task might well have been 
easier ifhe had given evidence. He has not ... [c]ommon sense compels you to reflect, does 
it not, that while he might or might not have added a great deal to the case he has abstained 
from making the contribution that he might have done. You may ask yourselves why. It is 
entirely a matter for you." Id. at 104--05. 
31 R. v. Sullivan, [1966] 51 Crim. App. 102,105. In Sullivan, the Court of Appeal stated that 
a judge was not entitled in any circumstances to suggest to ajury that if a defendant were 
innocent, the defendant would have answered police questions instead of remaining silent. 
Id. The court went on, however, to note that it was unclear what a judge could say in such a 
situation, because "the line dividing what may be said and what may not be said is a very fine 
one .... " Id. Ironically, although the court held that the comment was a misdirection, it 
affirmed the conviction in this case because "no possible miscarriage of justice [had] oc-
curred." Id. at 105-06; see also R. v. Davis, [1959] 43 Crim. App. 212, 215-16 (conviction 
quashed on appeal where judge commented, "[c]an you imagine an innocent man who had 
behaved like that not saying something to the police ... [h]e said nothing."); R. v. Naylor, 
[1933] 1 K.B. 685, 685 (conviction quashed where judge, commenting on defendant's refusal 
to answer questions at time he was charged, remarked that "surely, if he [defendant] is 
innocent one would think he would ... make his defence then and there."). 
32 See Greer, supra note 3, at 713; R. v. Raviraj, [1987] 85 Crim. App. 93, 103. 
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areas in which the judiciary may instruct the jury that adverse infer-
ences from silence may be drawn as corroborative evidence of a 
criminal charge.33 
The first area is a general one of evidentiary corroboration, where 
a suspect remains silent with regard to any explanation of suspicious 
conduct. For example, silence may strengthen the inference that a 
possessor of stolen goods is the thief or their receiver, or that a 
defendant who was present in someone else's house had gained 
entrance illegally.34 Permitting inferences in such cases is only part 
of a broader proposition that inferences may be drawn from a 
defendant's unreasonable behavior when confronted with accusa-
tory facts. 35 
The second major area of greater judicial discretion lies in the 
so-called "ambush defense" problem.36 This problem occurs when a 
suspect waits until trial to reveal an unexpected defense, such as an 
alibi, to the prosecution, and his silence at earlier pre-trial question-
ing naturally gives rise to the perception that the later explanation 
has been concoctedY In such cases, one judge's indignant dictum 
that "a fishy story is all the worse for being stale"38 appears to have 
historically held sway.39 In R v. Ryan, the Court of Appeal upheld a 
conviction where the judge instructed the jury that, when assessing 
33 But see EASTON, supra note 3, at 10. There is a line of precedent in the appellate courts 
which seems to support the proposition that comment which encourages the jury to treat 
silence as corroborative of other evidence adverse to the defendant is always misdirection. R. 
v. Keeling, [1942] 1 All E.R. 507, 509; R. v. Whitehead, [1929] 1 K.B. 99, 102. This line of 
cases, however, has not deterred judges from drawing such corroborative inferences. See, e.g., 
Whitehead, 1 K.B. at 102 n.l (citing Lord Alverstone) ("The non-denial of the offence by the 
prisoner, when formally charged by police, is not corroboration. We are far from saying that 
evidence of non-denial cannot be corroboration, for in some cases the absence of indignant 
denial would amount to that. ... "). 
34 Raviraj, 85 Crim. App. at 94; R. v. Wood, [1911] 7 Crim. App. 56, 58 (judge's instruction 
regarding defendant's failure to explain his presence in home was "a mere common sense 
statement" because on these facts jury was entitled to find intent if the defendant gave no 
satisfactory explanation); see also Greer, supra note 3, at 713. 
35 Raviraj, 85 Crim. App. at 103. 
36 Andrew Ashworth & Peter Creighton, The Right of Silence in Northern Ireland, in LESSONS 
FROM NORTHERN IRELAND 123 (1990) ;J.D. Jackson, Curtailing the Right of Silence: Lessons from 
Northern Ireland, 42 N. IRL. LEGAL. Q. 404, 405 (1991); Greer, supra note 3, at 713. 
37 See DJ. Galligan, Silence Reconsidered, CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 69, 77-78 (1988) ("[ilt is 
hard to resist the conclusion, which seems to be so naturally compelling, that the fact of earlier 
silence affects the plausibility or weight of the later explanation.") Id. 
38 Greer, supra note 3, at 713 (quoting Hinton v. Trotter, [1931] S.A.S.R. 123, 127). 
39 See Wolchover, supra note 28, at 434 ("invitations to the jury to take into account failure 
to mention a fact later relied on had become permissible long before 1972, as the authorities 
clearly show. "). 
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defendant's disclosure of an alibi at trial, they could take into ac-
count the fact that his pre-trial silence deprived the police of an 
opportunity to investigate that alibi.40 The "ambush defense" has 
consistently aroused the ire of the British judiciary when determin-
ing the extent to which the right to silence protects the criminal 
suspect at trial. It is importan t, however, to note that not all judicial 
comment in this context will be tolerated; again, whenever comment 
has involved stressing comparison with the notional behavior of the 
innocent, convictions have almost always been overturnedY 
2. Stage of Silence 
The stage in which the suspect exercises his right to silence 
influences the extent to which the jury may draw adverse inferences 
from this silence.42 Generally, a trial judge is given much greater 
latitude to comment on a defendant's failure to testify than for a 
defendant's refusal to answer police questions.43 According to the 
1972 report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, judges re-
ceived broader discretion because a defendant's failure to "give 
evidence" (testify at trial) stood less of a chance of being misunder-
stood, the defendant was less likely to panic or be inadequately 
prepared, and his testimony was in response to a prima facie case.44 
The common law, then, implicitly regards it as relatively "fairer" to 
allow judicial comment on a refusal to testify rather than on a refusal 
to answer police questions.45 
The boundaries of proper judicial comment upon a failure to give 
40R. v. Ryan, [1966] 50 Crim. App. 144, 147-48. 
41 Wolchover, supra note 28, at 428 ("direct invitation to infer guilt has almost always been 
held to be misdirection"); seeR v. Naylor, [1933]1 K.B. 685,686; R v. Whitehead, [1929]1 
K.B. 99, 102. 
42The Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report, 1972, Cmnd. 4991 [hereinafter 
C.L.RC. REPORT] 
[It] seems that the judge is in a much stronger position even under the present law, 
if he thinks fit, to invite the jury to draw an adverse inference from the failure of 
the accused to give evidence of some matter than he is to invite them to do so from 
failure of the accused to mention a matter when interrogated by the police." 
Id.; see Greer, supra note 3, at 715. 
43 C.L.R.C. REpORT, supra note 42, at 68. 
44Greer, supra note 3, at 715. 
45 See Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor, [1982] 3 All E.R. 14, 18. In that case, Lord Diplock 
noted that "English law has always recognized the right of the deciders of fact in a criminal 
case to draw inferences from the failure of a defendant to exercise his right to give evidence 
and thereby submit himself to cross-examination." Id. 
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evidence generally lie within the province of judicial discretion,46 
subject to two general propositions. These propositions require that 
ajudge, before commenting to ajury, should point out first, that a 
defendant is not bound to give evidence, and second, that such 
comment should not imply that silence can bolster a weak prosecu-
tion caseY Indeed, in R v. Sparrow, the Court of Appeal stated that, 
subject to his "duty to be fair," if the trial judge had not commented 
in strong terms, he would have been failing in his duty.48 
3. Presence of Solicitor 
The third factor that British appellate courts have looked to is the 
existence of "even terms" questioning, founded on the Chandler 
decision.49 In Chandler, the Court of Appeal stated: when persons are 
speaking on even terms, and a charge is made, and the person 
charged says nothing, and expresses no indignation, and does noth-
ing to repel the charge, that is some evidence to show that he admits 
the charge to be true.50 The court asserted that presence of a solici-
tor at a police interrogation put the suspect and police on more 
even terms, and thus a suspect's silence in this context could more 
readily be the subject of judicial comment,5l 
46 See R. v. Rhodes. [1899] 1 Q.B. 77, 83. In the seminal case in this area, the court noted 
that "[t]here are some cases in which it would be unwise to make any comment at all; there 
are others in which it would be absolutely necessary in the interests of justice that such 
comments should be made. That is a question entirely for the discretion of the judge." [d. 
47R. v. Bathurst, [1968] 2 Q.B. 99,107. [The] 
accepted form of comment is to inform the jury that, of course, [the defendant] is 
not bound to give evidence ... and that while the jury [has] been deprived of the 
opportunity of hearing his story tested in cross-examination, the one thing they must 
not do is to assume that he is guilty because he has not gone into the witness box. 
[d. 
id. 
48 R. v. Sparrow, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 488, 495. It is the judge's duty to give the jury members 
the benefit of his knowledge of the law and to advise them in the light of his 
experience as to the significance of the evidence, and when an accused person elects 
not to give evidence, in most cases but not all the judge should explain to the jury 
what the consequences of his absence from the witness box are ... 
49 Greer, supra note 3, at 713-14. 
50 R. v. Chandler, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 585, 589 (quoting R. v. Mitchell, [1892] 17 Cox C.C. 503, 
508). 
51 Greer, supra note 3, at 714; see also Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Sauree of 
Testimcmial Evidence: A Compariscm of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.R. 
1, 11 (1986) ("If, prior to the warning a suspect and police officer are speaking on even terms, 
and the officer makes an accusation against the suspect which an innocent person would be 
expected to deny, the suspect's silence may be used as an acknowledgement that the accusa-
tion is true.") (citing Chandler, 1 w.L.R. at 589; R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 549 (5th ed. 1979». 
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In the post-Chandler period, British courts have taken the "even 
terms" rationale one step further in allowing greater discretion for 
adverse inferences. Because section 58 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (1984) (PACE) codified the right of the criminal 
suspect to have access to a solicitor at any pre-trial stage, the "even 
terms" scenario has become the norm.52 Bolstered by the impression 
that the presence of a solicitor inevitably hinders police work, courts 
have begun to strike a balance between the reinforced righ t of access 
to legal counsel and greater discretion for adverse inferences from 
the suspect's right to silence.53 In R v. Alladice, the Lord Chief 
Justice of the Court of Appeal commented that the effect of section 
58 of PACE was such that the "balance of fairness" between the 
prosecution and defense could not be maintained without permit-
ting proper comment on the right to silence, including that of the 
prosecution.54 In fact, the judiciary has begun clamoring in dictum 
for a full quid pro quo in return for enforcement of section 58 
rights, in which the caution would be modified to permit adverse 
inferences to be drawn from silence at any time.55 
4. Caution 
The final factor which manifests itself in the case law is whether 
the suspect has been given a "caution" by police alerting him of his 
right to silence.56 The seminal case is Chandler, in which the Court 
52 See Andrew Sanders, Access to a Solicitar and 78 of PAGE, 87 L. SOC 'y GAZETTE 17 (1990); 
see also Deidre Lane, License to Kill? PAGE and Emergency Legislation in Northern Ireland (Apr. 
29, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Boston College International and Com-
parative Law Review). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE 84) and its 
counterpart PACE 1989, which applied to Northern Ireland, attempted to codity rules of 
procedure for police-suspect encounters. Lane, supra, at 3. PACE 84 reformed arrest proce-
dures, detention procedures, conditions for questioning and treatment of suspects by police, 
and certain evidentiary provisions. Id. Central to the legislation was section 58, which man-
dated a right to legal advice for most suspects in police custody. Sanders, supra, at 17. 
53 See R. v. Alladice, [1988] 87 Crim. App. 380, 384-85. 
54Id. at 385. 
55 See id. at 385 ("It is high time that such comment should be permitted together with the 
necessary alteration in the words of the caution."); see also AA.S. Zuckerman, Evidence, in 
1988 ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE ALL ENGLAND LAw REPORTS 134, 146--47 (necessary "to secure 
a quid pro quo for the enforcement of section 58 rights, in terms of a new right to comment 
adversely on the suspect's failure to reveal a defence later sprung on the prosecution ... and 
the modification of the caution to enable inferences to be drawn") [hereinafter ANNUAL 
REVIEW]. 
56The caution, like the Miranda warning in the United States, serves to inform a criminal 
suspect of his right to refuse to answer questions from police. See Greer, supra note 3, at 
712-14; EASTON, supra note 3, at 118-19. In England and Wales, cautions must be adminis-
tered to persons in police custody in three circumstances: when grounds for suspicion that 
436 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVI, No, 2 
of Appeal held that in the absence of a caution, there was no rule 
of law which prohibited the drawing of an inference in a criminal 
trial from the defendant's silence.57 This apparently repudiated a 
contradictory line of decisions which had culminated in Lord 
Diplock's decision in Hall v. R58 These decisions rested on the 
premise that the right to silence was a "clear and widely known 
principle of common law" which existed independent of the cau-
tion, and served to protect the accused from any adverse inferences 
except in exceptional circumstances.59 Chandler swept away any no-
tion of a common law right to silence which barred the drawing of 
adverse inferences, leaving only the existence of the cautioning 
practice to preclude such inferences.6o 
Thus, where the caution has been administered prior to police 
questioning, judicial comment upon ensuing silence is much more 
closely scrutinized.61 Indeed, in one case the Court of Appeal held 
that once a defendant has been cautioned, the trial judge is required 
they have committed an offense have arisen; upon arrest and charge; and when there have 
been breaks between interview sessions under caution. Greer, supra note 3, at 714 (citation 
omitted). 
57 Wolchover, supra note 28, at 434. 
58 Hall v. R., [1971] 1 All E.R. 322. 
59 [d. at 324. 
6oWolchover, supra note 28, at 434. In Hall, the Privy Council held that: 
it may be in very exceptional circumstances an inference may be drawn from a failure 
to give an explanation or a disclaimer but in their Lordships' view silence alone on 
being informed by a police officer that someone else has made an accusation against 
him cannot give rise to an inference that the person to whom this information is 
communicated accepts the truth of the accusation. 
All E.R. at 324. The Privy Council further remarked that, with regard to the effect of 
cautioning a criminal suspect, 
the caution merely serves to remind the accused of a right which he already possesses 
at common law. The fact that in a particular case he has not been reminded of it is 
no ground inferring that his silence was not in exercise of that right, but was an 
acknowledgement of the truth of the accusation. 
[d. The Court of Appeal in Chandler concluded that it had reservations about these two 
statements of law because they seemed to conflict with Christie and other earlier cases and 
authorities. Chandler, 1 W.L.R. at 589. The Chandler court felt that 
the law has long accepted that an accused person is not bound to incriminate 
himself; but it does not follow that a failure to answer an accusation or question 
when an answer could reasonably be expected may not provide some evidence in 
support of an accusation. Whether it does will depend on the circumstances. 
[d. The Chandler court expressly declined to follow Hall. [d. at 590. 
61 The 1981 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, which will be dis-
cussed later, noted that once a defendant has been cautioned, it is "unsafe to use his silence 
against him for any purpose whatever." See Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 13. 
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to instruct the jury that no inference of guilt is to be drawn from 
silence.62 The court issued its holding reluctantly, however, and in 
any event did not go so far as to bar trial courts from allowing 
evidence of the fact that the suspect exercised his rights under the 
caution to go to the jury.63 
It is the latter distinction which is crucial to an understanding of 
the right to silence in the United Kingdom at common law. For 
although the judge appears required to instruct the jury that no 
adverse inferences are to be drawn from post-caution silence, evi-
dence of that silence will always reach the jury.64 Because juries are 
likely to be influenced by the notion that "guilt invokes the privilege 
of silence" and draw inferences despite the judge's instruction, one 
commentator has argued that such an instruction is merely an 
indirect method of holding silence against a criminal defendant.65 
C. Analysis of Common Law Right to Silence 
Thus the right to silence at common law has evolved into some-
thing which more closely resembles a privilege. Although it may be 
true that "the whole basis of the common law is the right of an 
individual to refuse to answer questions put to him ... by a person 
in authority,"66 the right to remain silent in the face of authority is 
only that: the right to remain silent, with no further guarantees. 
Because the judiciary has accepted the notion set forth in Chandler 
that there is no common law rule against drawing adverse inferences 
from silence, the appellate court cases reviewed above make it clear 
62R. v. Gilbert, (1977) 66 Crim. App. 237, 243. 
63 See, e.g., id. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge "rightly" told the jury that no 
adverse inference was to be drawn against the defendant on account of his refusal to answer 
questions put to him by the police. Id. The court went on to explain that 
[t)he words of the caution made it clear that he was entitled to keep silent. As the 
law now stands, although it may appear obvious to the jury in the exercise of their 
common sense that an innocent man would speak and not be silent, they must be 
told that they must not draw the inference of guilt from his silence. 
Id.; see also Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 13. 
64Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 13, 137 ("it is widely recognized, however, that often the 
trier of fact will nevertheless draw adverse inferences from unjustified refusals to answer 
questions"). Moreover, evidence of post-caution silence to police questioning comes before 
the jury whether or not the defendant gives evidence. Id. at 137-38. 
65 See id. at 13-14. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure observed that whatever 
a judge may say to a jury concerning a defendant's silence, "it does not, indeed it cannot, 
prevent a jury or bench of magistrates from drawing an adverse inference." Id. 
66 See CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 9 (Brice Dickson ed., 1990) (citing Rice v. 
Connolly, [1966) 2 Q.B. 414,419 (while there may be a moral or social duty to assist police, 
there is no legal duty)}. 
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that such inferences are legitimized by comments on silence from 
the bench. 
Even the administration of the caution does not prevent evidence 
of a defendant's silence at interrogation from reaching the jury, and 
in any event does not affect the judge's right to comment upon that 
defendant's failure to testify.67 The bundle of more specific legal 
rights68 thought by some commentators to be contained in the right 
to silence is not recognized implicitly at common law. Most sig-
nificant of all, the right protecting criminal suspects from having 
silence used against them has been greatly diminished.69 As Lord 
Devlin remarked in 1958, "while the English system undoubtedly 
does give the accused man the right to be silent, it does nothing to 
urge him to take advantage of his right or even to make the course 
invariably the attractive one. "70 
Moreover, recent years have also seen an increasing number of 
British statutes permitting adverse inferences to be drawn from 
silence in specific criminal contexts.71 In 1985, wide powers to com-
pel witnesses and suspects to answer questions and cooperate with 
investigators, including the abolishment of a general right to silence, 
were given to the Department of Trade and Industry.72 Similar pow-
ers were conferred upon the Serious Fraud Office in the 1987 
Criminal Justice Act, after a committee study identified the right to 
silence as a serious obstacle to the prosecution of white collar 
67 See Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 13 n.45. Van Kessel points out that evidence of this silence 
is still admissible, and forms part of the circumstances which the trier of fact must assess when 
weighing the prosecution's evidence. See id. at 12; see also Glanville Williams, The Tactic of 
Silence, 137 NEW LJ. 1107 (1987) (,The law does not forbid the jury to take the defendant's 
silence as confirming other evidence of guilt."). 
68 Galligan, supra note 37, at 77. 
69 See, e.g., Sonia Purnell, Maxwell's Fight for Silence Continues, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 15, 
1992, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, A1lnws File. LordJustice Dillon of the Court of Appeal 
recently remarked that "[y]ou get a lot of statements from high authority that the right to 
silence is a hallowed tradition in common law. But they are usually followed by a very big 
'but,' that it doesn't apply in any case where it might be a nuisance." Id.; see also John T. 
McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison 
D'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 138, 167 
(1960). 
70Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 147 (citation omitted). Lord Devlin went on to defend the 
law as it relates to silence, stating that "this dilemma in which the law puts the suspect ... 
seems to be a perfectly fair one." Id. 
71 In addition, the common law right to silence does not apply in the civil context. See 
Halford v. Brookes and Another, [1991] Q.B., THE TiMES (London), Oct. 3, 1991 (unpub-
lished transcript opinion). 
72 See A Fair Hearing for City Crimes, 140 NEW LJ. 1669 (1990); Jane Plumptre, The Right 
of Silence Disappears, 139 NEW LJ. 1070 (1989). 
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crime.73 Parliamentary acts designed to deter drug trafficking and 
money laundering have also contained such provisions.74 All of these 
statutes have created specific duties to answer police questions, the 
breach of which are punishable. 75 
In order to more fully understand the right to silence at British 
common law, however, it is useful to examine a different approach 
to silence in the criminal law context. For reasons which will emerge 
later in this Comment, the most instructive comparison is with the 
Fifth Amendment as embodied in the U.S. Constitution. 
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that 
"[no] person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself. "76 It has been demonstrated convincingly by 
legal historians that this constitutional right, which has come to be 
known as the privilege against self-incrimination, is a direct histori-
cal descendant of the common law right to silence in Britain.77 To 
fully understand the nature of the British "right" to silence, an 
examination of the Fifth Amendment is essential. As interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, the privilege against self-incrimination under 
the Fifth Amendment affords a criminal defendant a much different 
level of protection than that provided by its common law "father," 
the British right to silence. 
The privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment generally forbids any comment at trial on a criminal defen-
dant's silence in the face of accusation, or on the defendant's refusal 
to testifY.78 The Supreme Court, however, has limited this prohibition 
to silence after the defendant has been given the Miranda warning.79 
Thus, both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence which precedes the 
73 See Rod Fletcher & Scott Ingram, The Right of Silence: Does It Exist in Major Investigations?, 
87 L. SOC'Y GAZETTE 19 (1990). 
74 See id. 
75 Greer, supra note 3, at 711 n.15. 
76U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
77 See generally LEVY, supra note 8; James Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History 
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1966); see also N.Y. v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984) (O'Connor,]. concurring and dissenting) ("[the learning 
of England and certain other countries] was important to the development of the initial 
Miranda rule ... "); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-61 (1966); Ullmann v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (Fifth Amendment privilege is justified to prevent a "recur-
rence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality ... "). 
78 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
79Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 11. 
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administration of the warning may be used to impeach a defendant's 
testimony at trial, though it is unclear whether such silence could 
be used as substantive evidence of guilt where a defendant failed to 
testifY.80 
In contrast, commenting on a criminal defendant's post-Miranda 
silence or refusal to testifY is constitutionally impermissible, and 
represents reversible error.8! The seminal case prohibiting comment 
on the refusal to testifY, Griffin v. California, noted that such com-
ment is a remnant of the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice" 
which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.82 By imposing a penalty for 
exercising a constitutional privilege, "[i]t cuts down on the privilege 
by making its assertion costly."83 In addition to the idea that negative 
consequences inevitably diminish the right itself, the courts have 
also articulated two other arguments against the admissibility of 
evidence of silence in this context: first, that admission of such 
evidence is fundamentally unfair because implicit in the Miranda 
warning is a guarantee that no adverse legal consequences will flow 
from the exercise of that right;84 and second, that the slight proba-
80 [d.; Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982) (holding that due process is not violated 
where the defendant takes the stand in his own defense, and the state is permitted cross-ex-
amination of a defendant as to his/her post-arrest silence in the absence of the sort of 
affirmative assurance embodied in the Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
241 (1980) (holding that Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of pre-arrest silence to 
impeach a criminal defendant's credibility). Both cases were distinguished from Doyle v. Ohio 
426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding that the use of post-arrest silence which followed Miranda 
warning violated due process), on the grounds that where the warning had been given, the 
government could be said to have induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that 
his silence would not be used against him. Weir, 455 U.S. at 606. It is therefore clear that "the 
receipt of Miranda warnings is determinative of the constitutional issue." United States v. 
Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982). 
81 United States. v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991); see Griffin, 380 U.S. at 
612. Any evidence of a defendant's post-warning silence is inadmissible at trial, either as 
substantive evidence or for impeachment purposes. Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 12. Comment 
on silence or failure to testify may not, however, always mandate reversal. LeQ}lire, 943 F.2d 
at 1554 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,22 (1967». In determining whether the 
comment constitutes reversible error, the test is whether the defense can show that the remark 
was intended to comment on the defendant's silence or was of such character that a jury 
would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant's silence. [d. 
(citing United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,459 
U.S. 1209 (1983». 
82 380 U.S. at 614 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1963». 
83 [d. at 615. 
84 See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 ("[TJhe Griffin case stands for the proposition 
that a defendant must pay no court-imposed price for the exercise of his constitutional 
privilege not to testify."). 
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tive value of the evidence itself is outweighed by the strong possibility 
of prejudice.85 
The evidentiary consequences of a criminal defendant's invoca-
tion of his Fifth Amendment privilege of silence in U.S. courts are 
severely limited.86 Indeed, the admission of evidence relating to such 
silence at a criminal trial is strictly prohibited where a defendant has 
been informed of his rights under Miranda. 87 Justice Black's concur-
rence in Grunewald v. United States eloquently summarizes the rea-
soning which gives rise to this interpretation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination: 
I can think of no special circumstances that would justify 
use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a 
person who asserts it. The value of constitutional privileges 
is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying 
on them. It seems peculiarty incongruous and indefensible 
for courts which exist and act only under the Constitution 
to draw inferences of lack of honesty from invocation of a 
privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement in the Constitution.8S 
Because the Constitution strictly prohibits the admissibility of any 
evidence relating to a criminal defendant's invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, including com-
ment upon silence, the U.S. "privilege" in practice functions very 
much like the fundamental "right" the Constitution deems it to be. 
III. THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (N.I.) ORDER 1988 
A. Background to Statutory Curtailment 
1. Criminal Law Revision Committee 
In 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) proposed 
to greatly restrict the right to silence then "enjoyed" by the accused.89 
85 Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 12; see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.s. 610,618 (1976); United States 
v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975). 
86 But see United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25,31-32 (1987). Griffin does not preclude 
any "direct" reference by the prosecution to a defendant's failure to testifY; where prosecutor 
is responding to defense counsel's remarks that the government had not allowed the defen-
dant an opportunity to tell his story, and refers to the defendant's failure to testifY, Griffin 
and the Fifth Amendment are not broached. [d. 
87Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 13; see also Hale, 422 U.S. at 180. 
88353 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1957) (Black,]. concurring). 
89 C.L.R.C. REPORT, supra note 42, at 16. 
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Noting that the prosecution had the burden of proving guilt, the 
committee defined the right at common law as the right to refrain 
from giving evidence, as well as to be free from prosecutorial com-
ment on this decision.90 The committee recommended that the 
court be allowed to draw whatever inferences were proper from 
"ambush defense" scenarios.91 In addition, silence in the courtroom 
and at the police station should amount to corroborative evidence 
where the silence was "material."92 It further recommended permit-
ting adverse inferences to be drawn from a refusal, in the absence 
of "good cause," to give evidence at trial, as well as a modification 
of the cautioning procedure to advise suspects of these implications 
of silence.93 Reaction to the committee's recommendations was ve-
hemently unfavorable, and the legislative thrust of the report was 
effectively suspended for the remainder of the decade.94 
.. 
2. Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
In 1981, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Royal 
Commission) considered the right to silence in the context of pro-
posed changes in criminal procedure.95 Its conclusions differed 
greatly from the CLRC's recommendations. A majority of the Royal 
Commission advised that the current common law on the right to 
silence be retained.96 Despite some division, the majority based its 
conclusion on pre-trial testimony on two grounds: the added psy-
chological pressure to answer increased the likelihood of damaging 
statements from innocent people; and the inconsistency that existed 
between using silence against a defendant and the prosecution's 
burden of proof.97 In addition, it almost unanimously endorsed the 
right to silence at tria1.9s The commission's conclusions were implic-
90ld. at 16 n.l. 
911d. at 19. 
921d. at 23; see Greer, supra note 3, at 715. The reference to "material" was not expanded 
upon. 
93Greer, supra note 3, at 715 (citing C.L.R.C. REpORT, supra note 42, at 68-70). 
94 See Greer, supra note 3, at 715. 
95 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1981, CMND. No. 8092 [hereinafter 
RCCPj. 
961d. at 87 '!! 4.53. 
971d. at 86 'I 4.50-4.5l. 
981d. at 90, 'lI. 4.66; see Greer, supra note 3, at 715. The RCCP appears to have conceived of 
the then-current law position as protecting the criminal suspect from adverse inferences. As 
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itly accepted in the codification of police powers enacted under 
PACE 1984.99 
B. The Order 
1. Emergence of Statutory Restriction 
The debate over the merits of the right to silence, somewhat 
subdued following the enactment of PACE 1989, re-emerged pub-
licly in 1987. Then Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, in a lecture to 
the Police Foundation, expressed the government's interest in re-
forming the law relative to the right to silence.lOo By 1988, a Home 
Office working group had been convened to study the idea. 101 While 
the working group was in the midst of its study, the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, Tom King, announced that, in connection 
with the government's efforts to combat terrorism, he would be 
introducing a draft Order before Parliament. 102 The Order was in-
tended to curb the right to remain silent for criminal suspects in 
Northern Ireland by allowing courts to draw adverse inferences from 
silence. lo3 
On November 8, 1988, King opened debate on the order in the 
House of Commons by announcing that the changes were "modest" 
reforms designed to counter the unfair advantage gained by crimi-
nal suspects who exercised their right to silence.104 He characterized 
the exercise of the right as a "calculated campaign" to frustrate 
justice on the part of those suspected of terrorism and other serious 
crimes. 105 The changes, he asserted, were necessary to restore the 
balance to the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. 106 He also 
has been demonstrated above, however, this is not quite where the common law stands, or 
stood in 1981. 
99 Greer, supra note 3, at 716. 
100 Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 122; Greer, supra note 3, at 716. 
101 Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 122. The 1989 Report of the Working Group on 
the Right of Silence ultimately recommended that they "should make more frequent and 
robust use of their right to comment on failure to give evidence." PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 233 
(M.N. Howard ed., 14th ed. 1990). 
102 Charles Hodgson & Raymond Hughes, King Curbs Right to Remain Silent, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 1988, at 28. 
103 [d. 
104 Charles Hodgson, Plan to Curb Silence Approved, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1988, at 15. 
105 [d. 
106 [d. 
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noted that similar changes were being considered for England and 
Wales. 107 
The opposition to the Order was vocal, but ill-prepared to combat 
the Order-in-Council procedure. 108 It passed the House of Commons 
after less than three hours of debate; two days later, the House of 
Lords also passed the Order. 109 Because the Order was introduced 
in this manner, it was both unamendable and impossible to scruti-
nize closelyYo Moreover, the Order, thought at first to have been 
aimed at terrorism and other serious crimes in Northern Ireland, 
applied in its enacted form to all criminal suspects. III Finally, the 
Order was passed despite the fact the government had not yet 
finalized the language to be contained in the new caution.ll2 
The Labour Party spokesman for Northern Ireland, Kevin 
McNamara, denounced the Order as "simplistic and repressive," 
stating that Parliament was overturning one of the pillars of the 
British system of justice.1l3 Seamus Mallon, M.P. for Newry and 
Amargh in Northern Ireland, condemned the Order as a cynical 
attack on individual rights in an effort to solve a political problem-
the Northern Ireland question.u4 Although there was wide opposi-
tion to the Order in the legal community, it became law on Decem-
ber 15, 1988.115 
2. Scope and Substance: The Language 
The Criminal Evidence (N.!.) Order 1988 restricts a criminal 
suspect's right to silence in four specific situations. ll6 The first situ-
107 ld.; Hodgson & Hughes, supra note 102, at 28. Although the 1989 Report of the Home 
Office Working Group on the Right to Silence recommended that changes similar to those 
promulgated in the Order be instituted in England and Wales, Parliament has yet to act. See 
generally AA.S. Zuckerman, Trial iJy Unfair Means-The Report of the Working Group on the 
Right of Silence, CRIM. L. REV. 855 (1989). 
108 Hodgson, supra note 104, at 15; see Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 122-23. For 
a full discussion of this mechanism of delegated legislation, the order-in-council, see generally 
B. Hadfield, Delegated Legislation: Problems of Accountability (1989) (unpublished conference 
paper, King's College, London). ld. at 123 n.18. 
109 !d.; Jackson, supra note 3, at 108. 
llO Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 122; Hodgson, supra note 104, at 15 ("The 
changes are to be introduced by an order in council which cannot be amended by Parliament. 
This caused considerable unease among both Labour and Conservative backbenchers."). 
111 Jackson, supra note 3, at 108. 
112 Hodgson, supra note 1 04, at 122. 
113 ld. 
114Id. 
115 See Ulster Lawyers Protest at Right of Silence Plan, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1988, at II;Jackson, 
supra note 3, at 108 n.4. 
116 See Jackson, supra note 36, at 405. 
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ation is, predictably, those cases of ambush defense or late explana-
tion. Article three of the Order applies where a defendant fails 
during police questioning to mention any fact later relied upon in 
his defense at tria1.1l7 Adverse inferences from this omission were to 
be permitted where the accused, "in the circumstances existing at 
the time ... could reasonably have been expected to mention" the 
defense. lls Article three, however, contains no mention of the need 
to administer a caution to a suspect being questioned. ll9 
Article four of the Order applies in the second of the four situ-
ations, where a defendant declines to testifY at triaJ.l20 The bench 
must issue a caution, which warns the defendant of the conse-
quences of his refusal to be sworn or answer any questions without 
good cause. 121 The trier of fact, in determining the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant, may draw such inferences "as appear 
proper" from this silence. Such silence may also be treated via 
adverse inference as corroborative evidence.122 Finally, article four 
allows the prosecution, as well as the judge, to comment on a refusal 
to give evidence.123 Both articles three and four strongly resemble 
recommendations made by the C.L.R.C.124 
Article five applies in cases where a suspect refuses or otherwise 
fails to account to police for the presence of objects, substances, or 
marks on his person, clothing or possession or in any place in which 
he is at the time of his arrest. 125 Adverse inferences may be drawn 
in such an instance, but only where a constable reasonably believes 
that these may be attributable to the suspect's participation in a 
117 Id. 
llHJackson, supra note 3, at lOS. 
119 Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 12l. 
120 Jackson, supra note 36, at 405. 
121 See Jackson, supra note 3, at 115. The language of the Article 4 caution states: 
I am also required to tell you that if you refuse to come into the witness-box to be 
sworn or if, after having been sworn, you refuse, without good reason, to answer any 
question, the court in deciding whether you are guilty or not guilty may take into 
account against you to the extent it considers proper your refusal to give evidence 
or answer any question. 
R. v. Murray, Crown Court of Northern Ireland at *6 (Cr. Ct. N. Ir., Jan. IS, 1991), available 
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File. 
122 EASTON, supra note 3, at 72. 
123Jackson, supra note 36, at 405. The ability of the prosecution to comment upon a 
defendant's silence in Northern Ireland had been prohibited for sixty-five years by the 
Criminal Evidence (N.L) Act 1923. Id. 
124Id. 
125Jackson, supra note 36, at 405. 
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crime.126 In this situation, the Order requires that the constable 
inform the suspect of his suspicion, as well as provide a caution to 
warn of the consequences of refusal to explain. 127 
Article six follows closely on article five, in that it discusses the 
situation where a person fails to account to police for his presence 
at the scene of a crime for which that person is being questioned. 128 
Again, the Order permits adverse inferences only where the consta-
ble has a reasonable belief that the suspect's presence at that place 
and at that time may be attributable to his participation in the 
commission of the alleged offense, and that belief is communicated 
to the suspect.129 Articles five and six are culled from similar provi-
sions in sections 18 and 19 of the Irish Republic's 1984 Criminal 
Justice Act. 130 
Several common threads run through the 1988 Order. First, arti-
cles 3, 5 and 6 allow inferences to be drawn from silence at any 
pre-trial stage, whether or not a prima facie case has been estab-
lished. 131 The only limit in this context is article 2 (4), which provides 
that the inference drawn cannot alone establish a prima facie case 
or justifY a conviction.132 Additionally, all of the inferences permissi-
ble under the Order relate solely both to the accused's defense, as 
well as to the weight of the prosecution's case.133 The language of 
the Order permits any inference to be drawn from silence, with the 
only requirement being that it must "appear proper. "134 Finally, al-
though a new caution was issued by the Secretary of State to apply 
in Northern Ireland and reflect the implications of the Order, the 
Order itself makes no explicit mention of a caution.135 Hence it is 
126Jackson, supra note 3, at 116; EASTON, supra note 3, at 73. 
127 Jackson, supra note 3, at 116; Jackson, supra note 36, at 405; EASTON, supra note 3, at 
73-74. 
128 Jackson, supra note 3, at 1 l(i-17; Jackson, supra note 36, at 405; EASTON, supra note 3, 
at 73-74. 
129Jackson, supra note 3, at 116-17. 
130Jackson, supra note 36, at 405. 
131Id. at 406. 
132Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 119. 
133Jackson, supra note 36, at 406; see Zuckerman, supra note 107, at 963. Although Zuck-
erman concludes that this distinction is an empty one, the Order does "enable inferences to 
be drawn to directly bolster up the prosecution case." Id. 
134Jackson, supra note 3, at 115. 
135Id. at Ill. The Code of Practice on Detention and Questioning, promulgated under 
PACE 1989, specifies the caution to be used in relation to questioning under the Order. See 
EASTON, supra note 3, at 75. The suspect is advised that he may remain silent, but is warned 
of the significance of failing to mention facts or account for objects, marks, or his presence 
at a particular place. Id. 
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unclear how the Order is to be applied where a caution IS not 
administered.136 
C. Post-Order Right to Silence 
The Order has been generally interpreted cautiously by the 
Northern Ireland judiciary, although there are signs that they are 
becoming more comfortable with its broad application. 137 It should 
be noted here that, since 1972, most defendants charged with seri-
ous crimes in Northern Ireland receive bench trials in the so-called 
"Diplock courts. "138 Thus the trier of fact in almost all criminal trials 
in Northern Ireland is a judge, or a tribunal of judges.139 
At the outset, the early cases showed that the open-ended lan-
guage of the Order would not be interpreted recklessly. In R v. 
McDonnell, the trial judge held that a refusal to give evidence could 
be used in a supportive or corroborative manner. 140 Such a refusal 
could not, however, in the absence of other evidence, be used as 
"primary evidence of guilt. "141 
Another article four case specifically identified the link between 
the prosecution's burden of proof and the use of adverse infer-
ences. 142 In that case, the judge concluded that the failure to give 
evidence may justify a finding of guilt only where the prosecution's 
evidence already rests on the brink of beyond a reasonable doubt. 143 
136 Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 124; see R. v. McDonnell, (Belfast Cr. Ct., Mar. 
13, 1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File. 
137 See generally Jackson, supra note 36, at 410-15. It should be noted that under the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts, almost all criminal defendants in Northern 
Ireland are tried in nonjury sessions-the so-called "Dip lock" court system. See generally 
Stephen Greer & Antony White, A Return to Trial byJury, inJuSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE 
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 47-72 (A. Jennings ed., 1988). 
138 See Greer & White, supra note 137, at 47-72. Under the "Emergency Provisions" Acts, 
first promulgated in 1972 and subsequently amended several times, Parliament suspended 
the right to ajury trial for a wide range of criminal activity-crimes which were "though likely 
to be committed, in the main, by paramilitaries or their sympathizers." Id. at 47. Critics 
branded them "Diplock courts," after Lord Diplock, whose 1972 commission produced the 
recommendations upon which the measures were based. Id. Initially deemed "temporary," 
these and the other measures which make up the "emergency" acts aimed at terrorist activity 
remain, despite the constant cloud of controversy around them, the law in Northern Ireland. 
Id. at 47-72; see infra notes 189, 235 and accompanying text. 
139 See generally Greer & White, supra note 137, at 47-72. 
140 R. v. McDonnell, (Belfast Cr. Ct., Mar. 13, 1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas 
File. 
141Id. 
142 SeeJackson, supra note 36, at 410-11 (citing R. v. Smyth, extempore judgment, Mar. 10, 
1989 (Kelly, LJ». 
143Id. 
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This holding seems to reflect an initial judicial trend toward caution, 
in which the bench refused to use the Order to bolster up a weak 
government case. 144 Indeed, J.D. Jackson, reader in law at Queen's 
University in Belfast, reported that in a number of early cases, 
invitations by the prosecution to the judge, sitting as tribunal of fact, 
to draw article four inferences have been declined.145 
The Order appears to be gaining judicial adherence, however. R. 
v. Martin and Others involved the trial of several suspected members 
of the Irish Republican Army for false imprisonment and attempted 
murder of a government informant.146 In Martin, one defendant was 
repeatedly interrogated regarding his presence at the scene of the 
alleged crime. 147 Although police cautioned him in connection with 
articles three and six of the Order, the defendant refused to answer 
certain potentially incriminating questions. 148 Later, in the witness 
box, he provided an exculpatory explanation for his presence.149 In 
his opinion, the judge commented that he drew very strong infer-
ences against the defendant under both articles for remaining silent 
not, as the bench saw it, out of any political attitude or matter of 
principle, but as a tactical decision to withhold his line of defense. 150 
A second case which involves a more aggressive application of the 
Order is R v. Murray.151 In Murray, the defendant was on trial for 
the attempted murder of a part-time member of the Ulster Defense 
Regiment, a Protestant paramilitary group. 152 The prosecution's case 
was a "circumstantial one," based on forensic evidence which alleg-
edly connected the defendant with the get-away car as well as the 
discharge of a firearm.153 When cautioned under articles three and 
five of the Order, relating to his whereabouts at the time of the crime 
and the forensic evidence, the accused made no reply.154 At trial, the 
144Jackson, supra note 36, at 414. 
145 [d. 
146 (Cr. Ct. N. Ir., May 8,1991), available in LEXIS, Nilaw Library, Cases File. 
147 [d. at *31. 
148 [d. at *33-34. 
149 [d. at *34. 
ISO [d. at *35. On appeal, the convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. R. v. Martin 
& Others, (Court of Appeal (N.I.), July 7, 1992), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas 
File. 
lSI (Cr. Ct. N. Ir.,Jan. 18, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File. 
152 [d. at *1. 
153 [d. This evidence included mud-stained "army-type combat" trousers of the kind allegedly 
worn by the attackers, firearms residue on his clothing, a very small amount of fibers from a 
hair sample which matched those from a black mask allegedly worn by the attackers, and a 
fingerprint lifted off the car in which the victim was allegedly transported. See id. at *2-7. 
154 [d. at *6-7. 
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defendant refused to give evidence on his behalf, and the prosecu-
tion requested that the court draw inferences against him under 
articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Order. 
The defendant in Murray was convicted, and in his opinion, the 
judge noted that he drew adverse inferences against the defendant 
under both articles three and four. 155 Although before being cau-
tioned he had disclosed some general exculpatory facts, the judge 
found that his failure during interrogation to mention the particular 
matters which were relied on in his defense at trial, especially with 
respect to the "incriminating" fingerprint evidence, reduced the 
credibility of that defense and increased the weight of the prosecu-
tion's case. 156 Additionally, the judge stated that it was "remarkable" 
that the defendant had not given evidence, despite being warned as 
to the consequences of doing SO.157 Although it was "not the function 
of the court to conjure up reasons" for defendant's silence, the 
judge asserted that it was only "commonsense in the circumstances" 
to infer that he was guilty. 158 This inference, he concluded, was much 
more to the defendant's detriment than that drawn under article 
three. 159 
Additionally, the judge made some pointed comments with re-
spect to his common law right to draw adverse inferences from a 
criminal defendant's silence. These comments, as well as the general 
scope of judicial discretion under the Order, formed the grounds 
for the appeal in this case. In the fall of 1991, the Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.160 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted first that the trial judge 
155 See id. at *13, 18. The judge declined to draw any adverse inferences under article five. 
Id. 
156 Id. at *13. 
157 Id. at *18. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 R. v. Murray, (Court of Appeal (N.I.), Oct. 25, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, 
Nircas File. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial court's statement that it was entitled 
under common law to draw adverse inferences in the instant case constituted error. Id. at *25. 
It is clear, however, that the court did not wish to assess the overall state of the common law 
with regard to the right of silence. The court did not object to the general statements of the 
trial judge on this subject, including his assertion that: 
[q]uite apart from the entitlement to draw adverse inferences in certain cases from 
the failure of an accused to offer an explanation or a satisfactory explanation to the 
police when questioned, there is also at common law, the right of (a) a judge to 
comment in appropriate cases of an accused to give evidence (b) a trier of fact, in 
appropriate cases, to draw adverse inferences from such failure. 
R. v. Murray, at *9 (Cr. Ct. N. Ir., Jan. 18, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas 
File. 
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was correct in interpreting the Order in light of the objectives of 
the 1972 Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee.161 More-
over, it upheld the inferences drawn by the trial court, and outlined 
in a very general manner the extent of permissible inferences under 
the Order, relating such inferences to judicial "commonsense."162 
The court also stated that the Order permitted the drawing of 
appropriate adverse inferences by the fact-finder as long as a prima 
facie case existed, noting that the prosecution's case need not rest 
"on the brink of' proving guilt.163 Finally, the opinion noted that the 
fact-finder was not required to spell out in its judgment the precise 
inferences which were drawn from a criminal defendant's silence.164 
The overall effect of the Order is, however, difficult to determine. 
Certainly, its impact has been minimized by a prudent judiciary. The 
Order authorizes the trier of fact to draw inferences of guilt and 
corroboration which at common law were nominally prohibited. 
The analytical difference under the Order from the status of the 
right to silence at common law is debatable, however.165 Comment-
ing upon the Order in Martin, the judge wondered aloud whether 
the Order "merely removes the uncertainty of existing common law 
and states it with the clarity and robustness it does not appear to 
have."166 Although he went on to state his opinion that "significant 
inroads" into the right had been made by the Order, the quoted 
passage is telling.167 
161 R. v. Murray, at *28 (Court of Appeal (N.L), Oct. 25, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw 
Library, Nircas File. 
162 [d. at *39, 45. The court noted that "[ulnder Article 4, it would be improper ... to draw 
the bare inference that because the accused refused to give evidence in his own behalf he was 
therefore guilty." [d. at *39. Inferences were appropriate, however, under Article 4, where 
"commonsense permits;" where a prima facie case against the defendant exists, and where 
"there is no reasonable possibility of an innocent explanation .... " [d. 
163 [d. at *39. 
164 [d. at *42. 
165 See, e.g., Clarizio, supra note 1, at 86-87. The author details the 1988 pre-Order trial of 
William Quinn, a suspected member ofthe Irish Republican Army, on charges of murder and 
conspiracy to cause explosions. [d. at 79-81. Clarizio was disturbed by the judge's comments 
that by failing to give evidence at trial, Quinn had not rebutted the prosecution's case-"a 
disturbing departure from the presumption of innocence we believe defendants should enjoy." 
[d. at 86-87. Because British juries, like their counterparts in the United States, do not give 
special verdicts, it is difficult to assess the viability of hypotheses relating to the effect of the 
right to silence or its curtailment in the Order. 
166R. v. Murray, at *9 (Cr. Ct. N. Ir.,Jan.I8, 1991), available inLEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas 
File. 
167 [d. In the appeal of the Murray case, the Court of Appeal held that the Order had indeed 
changed the law with regard to the right to silence, but asserted this opinion on the grounds 
of substantive common law-it merely stated that the nonjury courts of Northern Ireland 
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IV. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (N.!.) ORDER 1988: 
A RADICAL BREAK WITH THE PAST? 
A. Objectives and Impact 
The Criminal Evidence (N.!.) Order 1988 was enacted during a 
period of renewed debate over the general right to silence perceived 
to be enjoyed by criminal suspects in the United Kingdom168 Pres-
sure from the Police Federation was at the forefront of the contin-
ued controversy.169 The major criticisms of the right to silence were 
that it frustrated police investigation of criminal activity by discour-
aging confessions and otherwise legitimate inquiry, and hindered 
proof of guilt at trial through the ambush defense. 17o Moreover, it 
did so in a manner that was counter to common sense, as silence in 
the face of accusation was clearly probative. l71 
An examination of the assumptions which lay behind the rationale 
for the Order is enlightening. Tom King, architect of the Order, told 
Parliament during debates over the Order that, of all of those de-
tained in Northern Ireland on charges of serious crimes, just under 
half refused to answer some questions, and some refused to answer 
any questions at all.172 He gave no source for his assertion, and no 
figures of this kind have been empirically demonstrated. 173 
The empirical findings have, in reality, shown that the opposite 
appears to have held true.174 Prior to the enactment of PACE 1984, 
studies cited by the 1981 Royal Commission pinned the number of 
criminal suspects in the United Kingdom who exercised their right 
to silence at pre-trial questioning at around 4 percent. 175 Of these, 
the great majority were convicted,176 clearly at odds with the notion 
had, prior to the Order, considered that the law prevented them from drawing adverse 
inferences from an accused's failure to testity. R. v. Murray, at *38 (Court of Appeal (N.L), 
Oct. 25, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Nircas File. The court's language implied 
that it was not taking a position with regard to the correctness of this notion. See id. 
168 See Greer, supra note 3, at 716; Williams, supra note 67, at 1107; Michael McConville, 
Silence in Caurt, 137 NEW LJ. 1169 (1987). 
169 Jackson, supra note 3, at 107. 
170 See Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 123. 
171 See Greer, supra note 3, at 724. Tom King, then secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 
told Parliament that "many people would think we were mad" not to permit the courts to 
draw adverse inferences. Id. 
172Id. at 723-24. 
173 EASTON, supra note 3, at 78. Because the evidence on which these figures were based 
has never been revealed, it is impossible to verity or challenge this assertion. Id.; see also 
Galligan, supra note 37, at 74. 
174Galligan, supra note 37, at 74. 
175Greer, supra note 3, at 720 (citations omitted). 
176 Galligan, supra note 37, at 74. 
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that exercising the right frustrated the prosecution of crime. Al-
though these numbers rose somewhat in the years following PACE,177 
the difference was inconsequential. 178 Such figures do not support 
the popular quid pro quo approach to restricting the right to silence 
in this situation, which allegedly arose out of the reinforced legal 
safeguards offered by PACE. 
There has been minimal research done on the exercise of the 
right in post-Order Northern Ireland. 179 In a survey of 121 con tested 
cases in Belfast Magistrates' Court and Crown Court, carried out in 
a period which overlapped the introduction of the Order, 75 percent 
of defendants gave evidence in Magistrates' Court while 48 percent 
gave evidence in the Crown Court. ISO While these numbers may seem 
relatively lower than those cited for pre-trial questioning, it is in-
structive to note that the percentages remained the same following 
introduction of the Order.l8l Overall, these numbers point to two 
conclusions: first, that the government greatly exaggerated the im-
portance and use of the right to silence, and second, that limited 
research shows that the Order has yet to provide a compelling 
incentive for suspects to waive this "right." 
In court, the Order has generally been interpreted cautiously.IS2 
Judges have gone to great pains to emphasize that inferences from 
silence will not alone be sufficient to justify a prima facie case or a 
conviction. ls3 The Order, in addition, has not yet been used to 
bolster a weak government case and support a conviction. ls4 As R 
v. Murray shows, however, the Order has been used to the govern-
ment's advantage, in that case to justify strong adverse inferences 
against a defendant who sprung an ambush defense and later re-
fused to give evidence. ISS 
177 See Jackson, supra note 3, at 107 n.l; Greer, supra note 3, at 721. 
178 See Galligan, supra note 37, at 74. 
179 See Jackson, supra note 36, at 409. 
180Id. 
181Id. 
182 See supra notes 137-165 and accompanying text. A possible reason for the caution may 
be judicial fear of the slippery slope of widespread application of a statutorily-imposed rule 
of evidence which has no standards for the types of inferences to be drawn. See EASTON, supra 
note 3, at 74. 
183 SeeR. v. Murray, at *38 (Court of Appeal (N.L), Oct. 25,1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw 
Library, Nircas File; R. v. McDonnell, (Belfast Cr. Ct., Mar. 13, 1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw 
Library, Nircas File. 
184See Jackson, supra note 3, at 414. 
185 See R. v. Murray, (Cr. Ct. N. Ir.,Jan. 18, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw library, Nircas 
File. 
1993] RIGHT TO SILENCE 453 
The irony of the Order and its effect on criminal law in Northern 
Ireland, however, is how significantly it resembles the pre-Order 
state of the law.186 The right to silence at common law was only a 
right to remain silent-the consequences of which were unprotected 
and might manifest themselves in instructions from the bench out-
lining permissible adverse inferences. Chandler explicitly abrogated 
any notion of a common law rule against drawing adverse infer-
ences. 187 
Thus it is hardly surprising that the courts interpreting the Order 
have used the common law privileges as further justification for the 
employment of adverse inferences. In Murray, the bench asserted 
that at common law the trial court was entitled to comment on the 
failure to testifY at trial. 188 Moreover, the opinion flatly stated that 
the common law entitled the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences 
from the failure of a suspect to offer any explanation to police or 
from a defendant's refusal to give evidence. 189 If this view from the 
bench is accurate, as it appears to be,190 it is difficult to understand 
the controversy over the right to silence in the United Kingdom-in 
this light, the Order seems more a codification of a common law 
"privilege," rather than a radical curtailment of a common law 
"right. "191 
186 Empirical evidence, however, will never be able to determine with any finality whether 
there is a distinction between the right to comment on silence to the jury and the right to 
direct that jury to draw adverse inferences. Practically speaking, from notions of human 
nature, it seems difficult to argue that there is a distinction between the two. See EASTON, 
supra note 3, at 63-64. 
187 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
188 R. v. Murray, at *9-10 (Cr. Ct. N. Ir., Jan. 18, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, 
Nircas File. 
189Id. 
190 See supra notes 163-165. 
191 More persuasive objections can be raised on the grounds that the Order has been 
enacted to apply only to Northern Ireland. Since 1969, the province has been torn apart by 
political violence, civil disturbance and paramilitary activity, stemming from deep divisions in 
the populace over the legitimacy of the presence of the British government in Northern 
Ireland. See generally JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (1991); JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND (A. Jennings ed., 1988); NORTHERN IRELAND: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 
(J. Darbyed., 1983). The "Troubles" have spawned pervasive emergency legislation in North-
ern Ireland which has already shifted the balance between individual and state heavily in the 
state's favor, through emergency police powers, the use of delegated legislation and the denial 
of jury trials in certain cases. EASTON, supra note 3, at 80. Professor Easton argues that the 
case for retention of the right to silence applies even more strongly in Northern Ireland 
precisely because this legislation has already severely diminished individual rights. Id. 
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B. Silence: Rights and Privileges 
Nevertheless, one might ask whether the right to silence ought to 
be any more than a privilege. This section will attempt to analyze 
the general arguments for and against a right to silence which 
protects the criminal suspect from adverse inferences. Any assess-
ment of this question requires an examination of the competing 
policies which underlie the notions of silence as a right and privi-
lege. 
The right to silence in the United Kingdom operates as more of 
a privilege bestowed upon criminal defendants in certain situations 
than it does a right of criminal defendants subject to exceptions in 
certain situations. A "right" to silence, however, means more than 
just the absence of a legal obligation to talk to police or to testify in 
court. 192 A criminal defendant's "righ t" to silence consists of the right 
to be free from having that silence used against him, in the form of 
adverse inferences drawn at trial.193 Because the British "right to 
silence" does not as a baseline protect that right, it is really a misno-
mer. It is not so apparent why adverse inferences may still be used 
against a criminal defendant in the United Kingdom, the country 
from which the U.S. derived its classic Fifth Amendment rights.194 
1. The Government's Case 
The movement which resulted in the Criminal Evidence (N.r.) 
Order 1988 rests its case on three fundamental propositions. The 
first is that it is counterintuitive to argue that adverse inferences 
should not be drawn from silence, in that such silence is inherently 
probative of guilt. 195 Secondly, there is a widespread perception that 
the right hinders the prosecution of crime, particularly with regard 
to the "ambush defense. "196 The final proposition revolves around 
the notion that, given the added procedural safeguards of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Acts, the right is an anachronism.!97 This is 
the quid pro quo argument advanced by both scholars and jurists. 
All three of these propositions are fundamentally flawed. 
The first argument, that the right is counter to common sense, 
192 See Greer, supra note 3, at 710; see also Galligan, supra note 37, at 76-77. 
193 See Greer, supra note 3, at 710. 
194 See supra note 77. 
195 See EASTON, supra note 3, at 62-65. 
196 See supra notes 36-41. 
197 See supra note 55. 
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takes its cue from Bentham's cliched maxim, "innocence claims the 
right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence."198 Profes-
sor Glanville Williams argues that the right to be free from adverse 
inferences drawn from silence is contrary to common sense because 
"[i]t runs counter to our realisation of how we ourselves would 
behave if we were faced with a criminal charge."199 The case law is 
filled with similar aphorisms. 20o 
However inviting such a theory may be, it is only that-theory. It 
fails to consider two things. First, it ignores the fact that many of the 
rules of evidence shared by both the United Kingdom and the 
United States are inherently counterintuitive. This is so because they 
are rules which reflect considerations other than truth-seeking 
which are important to the process of criminal justice, such as 
reliability and protection against unfair prejudice.201 Secondly, the 
argument dismisses the numerous other reasons for silence.202 In 
their stead, it posits only one-the guilt of the criminal suspect. 
Common sense, then, is hardly a reliable guide in this context 
because it may wrongly equate silence with guilt. 203 
The second proposition supporting the notion that adverse infer-
ences should be drawn from silence is that the exercise of such a 
right otherwise frustrates police investigation and prosecution of 
crime.204 The empirical research strongly disputes this proposition. 
In the first place, the findings show that confessional evidence is 
only crucial in about 20 percent of the cases; in the rest, it provides 
only evidence of a supportive nature. 205 Moreover, the data suggests 
198 See supra note 18. 
199Williams, supra note 67, at 1107. 
200 See R. v. Chandler, [1976] 1 WL.R. 585, 590("we are bound by Rex v. Christie, not by 
Hall v. The Queen and Christie, in our judgment does accord with common sense"); R. v. 
Sparrow, [1973]1 WL.R. 488, 493; R. v. Wood, [1911] 7 Crim. App. 56, 58 (judge's direction 
to the jury relating to drawing the inference of intent from defendant's refusal to explain his 
presence at the crime scene was "a mere commonsense statement."). 
201 See Galligan, supra note 37, at 72-73. 
202 See EASTON, supra note 3, at 54. Defenders of the right to silence point out that there 
are many reasons for silence other than guilt-such as fear, embarrassment, anxiety, the desire 
to protect someone else, outrage, or anger-which are consistent with innocence. [d. Addi-
tionally, weaker, less educated, inarticulate, and poorer defendants may fear, with good reason, 
being misunderstood during interrogation or cross-examination. [d. at 61. 
203 See id. at 63-64 ("[G]iven that common sense is unreliable, untested, impressionable and 
unsystematic, it would seem a curious model for the law to follow."). 
204 Why Silence is a Right, 138 NEW LJ. 737 (1988). Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir 
Peter Imbert stated in 1987 that abolition of the right to silence would be "the most important 
single step legislators could take to control and reduce crime." [d. 
205 Galligan, supra note 37, at 74. 
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that of the small percen tage of suspects who do refuse to answer 
questions, the vast majority are convicted anyway.206 Such figures do 
not constitute specious reasoning; indeed, they refute the British 
police lobby.207 
Closely related to this proposition is the argument that the guilty 
are abusing their right to silence.208 By portraying the right as the 
refuge of the guilty, modern abolitionists are continuing to endorse 
Bentham's nineteenth century logic. Again, empirical evidence for 
such an assertion is slim.209 Moreover, this argument is not persuasive 
because in itself the use of a privilege or a right in criminal proce-
dure "does not negate its value or constitute a reason for abandon-
ing it. "210 It is not enough to say that the right to silence protects 
more guilty defendants than innocent ones.211 
Finally, the last proposition submitted by the government is that 
with the enactment of PACE, the right to silence is rendered unnec-
essary.212 Because the PACE-reinforced right of access to a solicitor 
confers upon the criminal defendant an additional weapon with 
which to trump police, a quid pro quo waiver of his right to silence 
is thus in order.213 AAS. Zuckerman, a leading proponent of this 
206Id. The pre-PACE studies showed that silence was not effectively preventing convictions-
these analyses concluded that "many ... silent suspects pleaded guilty; that 'ambush' defenses 
were rarely responsible for acquittals; and that 'those defendants viewed by the police as 
professionals ... confess[edl at about the same rate as others.'" Dixon, supra note 3, at 37 
(citations omitted). The post-PACE research shows that these propositions remain generally 
true. See infra notes 218-225. 
207 But see David Dixon, Common Sense, Legal Advice and The Right of Silence, PUB. L. 233, 
248 (1991). The author noted that empirical evidence demonstrating the relative insig-
nificance of confessional evidence may understate the significance of cases which are not 
taken to court because of a suspect's silence. Id. 
208 See EASTON, supra note 3, at 49. 
209Id. ("A remarkable feature of the right to silence debate has been that so far very little 
evidence has been offered to support the assertion that the guilty are abusing the right to 
silence .... "). A 1992 survey by Michael Zander, professor of law at London School of 
Economics, found that only 10 percent of defendants exercised their right of silence with 
respect to any questions, and that "ambush defenses" caused serious problems in only 2 
percent of the cases, according to the Crown Prosecution Service. u.K.: Evidence 'Tainted !Jy 
Police Behaviour in 500 Cases a Year, 'Reuters, Dec. 9,1992, available inLEXIS, Europe Library, 
Allnws File. 
210 EASTON, supra note 3, at 53 ("The principle of equal concern and respect demands that 
both the guilty and innocent are afforded procedural protections."). 
211 See Ellis, supra note 7, at 845. Ellis argues that this has always been assumed, and notes 
that even critics of the Fifth Amendment right recognize that most Americans agree that it is 
better to let a considerable amount of guilty persons go free than to convict any innocent 
persons. Id. 
212 See ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 55, at 146-47. 
213 See id. 
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theory of "exchange abolitionism,"214 maintains that because PACE 
has prescribed minimum standards for procedural fairness, the right 
to silence is no longer necessary to serve those needs.215 This propo-
sition, however, rests on shaky foundations-it assumes that access 
to legal advice and other procedural safeguards removes any legiti-
mate reason for a suspect to remain silent.216 As demonstrated pre-
viously, a suspect's silence is not necessarily the product of wholly 
legal concerns.217 
Besides relying on these unsteady assumptions, such an argument 
fails to comport with the reality of the post-PACE police station 
analyzed in Public Law.218 This examination of the right to silence 
in the context of a post-PACE police station revealed that many of 
the standard assumptions about the presence of solicitors were mis-
leading. Because the British criminal justice system, much like that 
in the United States, is not in practice "adversarial," the result is that 
the police "often perceive considerable advantages from a legal 
adviser's presence."219 The study found that, for the most part, the 
role of the solicitor in the police station was to explain the benefits 
of cooperation and discourage silence.22o Where the relationship be-
tween solicitor, criminal suspect, and police is seen as intrinsically 
sociological, as opposed to legalistic, this study argued that the quid 
pro quo thesis is misleading.221 
In addition, the quid pro quo rationale just does not hold up 
when scrutinized empirically. 222 The post-PACE studies simply do not 
support the notion that increased access to legal advice has in-
creased suspects' reliance on the right to silence.223 Moreover, one 
study found that 78 percent of an interview sample of British police 
214 Greer, supra note 3, at 721. 
215 See id. at 722 (citing A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 302-41 
(1989) ). 
216Greer, supra note 3, at 722. 
217 See supra note 202. 
218 See generally Dixon, supra note 207, at 235-54. 
219Id. at 239. 
22°Id. at 243, 252. Because confessions and guilty pleas are "the oil in the system," none of 
the legal advisers whom Dixon interviewed advised silence as a matter of course. Id. at 252. 
As a blanket rule such advice was thought to be "wholly pointless." Id. at 243. 
221 See id. at 253. 
222 Dixon, supra note 3, at 37-41. 
223Id. Three major studies, including one undertaken by the author in 1990, belie the claim 
that PACE has substantially changed reliance on the right to silence. Id. at 37-40. A fourth 
"limited survey" by the Metropolitan Police, which purportedly generated more favorable 
statistics for the abolitionists, has been acknowledged as methodologically flawed by its own 
researchers. Id. at 40. 
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constables, sergeants and inspectors themselves felt that PACE had 
no effect whatsoever on criminal defendants' exercise of the right 
to silence.224 Indeed, the most comprehensive analysis of the post-
PACE empirical studies concluded that "[a]ll the available, reliable 
research now tells the same story ... [that] PACE has not sig-
nificantly increased the use of silence ... [and that] silence does 
not reduce the rate at which suspects are charged or convicted. "225 
2. The Case for the Right to Silence 
A right to silence which incorporates the right to not have that 
silence used against one at trial should be restored to the British 
system of criminal justice.226 The case for a rehabilitated right along 
the lines of the Fifth Amendmen t privilege against self-incrimination 
has at its heart two fundamental assertions. First, without this right, 
the baseline attributes of the accusatorial system of criminal justice, 
the government's burden of proof and the defendant's presumption 
of innocence, are seriously undermined.227 Secondly, such a right 
protects values inherently important to any system of criminal justice 
which should not be sacrificed to fulfill the system's truth-seeking 
function. 
The "traditional" argument which supports a right to silence free 
from adverse consequences relies upon the idea that the preserva-
tion of such a right is essential to the maintenance of the accusato-
rial system of criminal justice in the common law tradition.228 The 
system's foundations are the prosecution's burden of proving guilt 
224 [d. at 38. Those interviewed compromised law enforcement personnel "with current 
operational experience, in contrast to the senior officers who publicly complain about PACE 
... " [d. 
225 [d. at 41 (citations omitted). 
226 See Ashworth & Creighton, supra note 2, at 133. The authors argue that "[iJf the right 
is soundly based in the prevailing context of English criminal justice ... then one should look 
towards reestablishing the right, rather than reasoning that there are so many erosions of the 
right already that its further curtailment will not be a step of great significance." [d. 
227 A corollary of this argument is the "lazy prosecutor" argument; that, by relying on the 
individual as the source of its case, the prosecution's incentive to obtain other evidence will 
be weakened and it may encourage improper practices. EASTON, supra note 3, at 111. 
228 See Greer, supra note 3, at 725; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (privilege 
against self-incrimination is "the essential mainstay of our adversary system ... "). 
It has also been argued that the debate in the United Kingdom about the right to silence 
"is as at least as much about its symbolic significance as it is about its practical value." Greer, 
supra note 3, at 724. This theory of symbolic retentionism, as author Stephen Greer calls it, 
was echoed by American legal scholar David Dolinko when he said that "a rule whose existence 
lacks any principled justification may nevertheless come to serve important functions in the 
legal system as a whole, so that its repeal would do violence to the entire system." David 
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beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of the defendant's 
innocence.229 The implicit corollary to these foundations is that the 
burden of proof necessarily requires that the government meet that 
burden solely through its own labor, rather than, as the Miranda 
court wrote, "by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from 
[the defendant's] own mouth."230Because logic dictates that the only 
inferences to be drawn from silence are ones adverse to the defen-
dant, permitting such inferences to be drawn directly or indirectly 
invariably weakens the state's burden of proof by making it easier to 
convict in cases in which evidence of silence is introduced.231 
Dolinko. Is There a Rationale for the Privilege against Self Incrimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
1063, 1077-78 (1986). DJ. Galligan expressed the theory in cultural terms, noting that it 
provides important symbols about how individuals stand vis-a.-vis a culture and its legal 
authority. See Galligan, supra note 37, at 85. 
229 See EASTON, supra note 3, at 108 (citations omitted). In Woolmington v. DPP, the court 
stated that the "golden thread running through the web of English law" was the state's burden 
of proof and that "no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained." See id. at 170; Greer, 
supra note 3, at 725. 
230 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940». 
Id. 
To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require the government 'to shoulder 
the entire load' ... to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accu-
satory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an 
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors .... ) 
There is an inconsistency of principle in requiring the onus of proof at trial to be 
upon the prosecution and to be discharged without any assistance from the accused 
and yet in enabling the prosecution to use the accused's silence in the face of police 
questioning under caution as any part of their case against him at trial. 
See RCCP, supra note 95, at 86. 
Under our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused 
not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the 
accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured 
through skillful investigation. 'The law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the 
deluded instrument of his own conviction.' 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,54 (1949) (citation omitted). 
231 See Greer, supra note 3, at 725. Greer argues that this is inevitable because the drawing 
of adverse inferences "will obviously have their greatest impact where the prosecution case is 
at its weakest ... [for example] where good forensic evidence, reliable confessions, and 
reliable testimony from other witnesses is absent." Id. The Criminal Law Revision Committee, 
which recommended curtailment of the right to silence, acknowledged as much in its report 
when it said that "failure to give evidence may be of little or no significance if there is no case 
against [defendant] ... or only a weak one. But the stronger the case is [sic] the more 
significant will be his failure to give evidence." C.L.R.C. REPORT, supra note 42, at 69. 
In contrast, Glanville Williams argues that such an argument is illogical, given that the judge 
or jury must still be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt on the evidence 
presented. Williams, supra note 67, at n08. Williams asserts that reasonable changes in the 
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The second and perhaps more influential argument for a re-
worked right to silence arises from the notion that such a right is 
necessary to the protection of values inherently important to the 
British system of criminal justice-values which should not be sac-
rificed to fulfill the system's truth-seeking function. 232 The Supreme 
Court remarked in Miranda that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is "founded on a complex ofvalues."233 This "complex of values" 
which, it is argued, justifies the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, has been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny, 
much of it critical,234 A strong case exists, however, for justifying a 
renewed right to silence in the United Kingdom on the grounds that 
it protects values fundamental to any system of criminal justice, 
values which can generally be grouped under the heading "fairness." 
The right to silence unencumbered by the possibility of adverse 
evidentiary consequences is necessary because the present state of 
the law is fundamentally unfair to criminal defendants. Indeed, it is 
law of evidence to allow direct adverse inferences would merely aid the prosecution in 
"discharging" its burden of proof, as opposed to shifting that burden. Id. This argument is at 
best technically correct, and is more a product of semantics than it is logic. Although the 
prosecution would still have to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, potentially significant 
evidence is now at its disposal, making it easier to "discharge" that burden. See Galligan, supra 
note 37, at 87. Additionally, where comment is permitted on silence, Easton argues that the 
whole focus of the trial shifts to the defendant, whose explanation or failure to supply an 
explanation becomes the focal point of the case, and in fact shifts a share of the burden onto 
the defendant. EASTON, supra note 3, at 110. 
232 See Dixon, supra note 207, at 247. Dixon notes that this "truth-seeking" function does 
not necessarily operate as such because "the 'truth' is not always objective or clear-cut. It 
sometimes has to be worked out, constructed, rationalized, negotiated. Police interrogation 
is therefore not just a process of discovering the 'truth', but is also a process of constructing 
it." Id. (citation omitted); see also EASTON, supra note 3, at 98-99. The author points out that 
constraints on the goal of rectitude are already accepted as legitimate in criminal procedure, 
including the "moral imperative that it is better for the guilty to be acquitted than to establish 
guilt by unjust means which violate human rights and dignity." Dixon, supra note 207, at 98. 
Moreover, it is argued that the legitimacy of the verdict incorporates both a factual dimension 
of accuracy as well as a moral dimension of the judgment's moral integrity. Id. at 101 (citation 
omitted). This moral authority of the verdict would be undermined if it were to be founded 
on violations of fundamental values of criminal law, such as "the right of all citizens to equal 
respect and dignity, recognition of autonomy and freedom of individuals .... " Id. 
233 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 
U.S. 52, 55-57 n.5 (1964»; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-15 n.12 (1966). 
234 See generally Dolinko, supra note 228; Lisa Tarallo, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination: The Time Has Come far the United States Supreme Court to End Its Silence on 
the Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 137, 
137-S8 (1992); Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence 
in Criminal Trials, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 285, 309-12 (1988); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth 
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968). 
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especially unfair in Northern Ireland, where the criminal justice 
system as a whole has been under constant attack from human rights 
groups for over twenty years.235 The "fairness" argument is rooted in 
both legal philosophy and procedural reality, and encompasses a 
range of values which the criminal justice system professes to pro-
tect. 
A restored right to silence would afford substantially more protec-
tion to the individual defendant's right to privacy, or the "right to a 
private enclave where he may lead a private life," as it was charac-
terized by the Supreme Court.236 Because privacy protects personal 
identity and autonomy, or "personality," it has stature as a right and 
thus is important enough to justifY imposing duties on others to 
protect it.237 The right to silence, in turn, protects privacy, in that it 
bars the state from intruding "into the private inner sanctum of 
individual feeling and thought" and imposes no conditions on that 
prohibition.238 
Critics of the privacy theory of justification have pointed out 
correctly that many crimes contain a mental element which the 
government attempts to prove by obtaining information about the 
235 The years 1992-93 alone saw the publication of several reports highly critical of the 
criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. Amnesty International's 1991 Annual Report, 
released in June 1992, revealed that "[c]ivilian deaths, unfair trials and ill-treatment of 
suspects in Northern Ireland continued to mar Britain's human rights record .... " Ulster 
Still Taints Britain's Human Rights Record-Amnesty, Press Association Newsfile, July 9, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File. Earlier that summer, the Haldane Society 
published a report which called for urgent reform of the system, charging that the Diplock 
court system bordered on "conveyor belt justice," and noting that the issue " ... is not 
miscarriage of justice; but that the [emergency legislation] does not provide an adequate 
'carriage' for justice in the first place." David Sharrock, UK: Call to Halt Ulster Murder 
Trials-Haldane Society, Reuter Textline, June 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, 
Allnws File. Moreover, the "abrogated" right to silence under the 1988 Order has drawn 
constant criticism from these groups-a 1993 Amnesty report concluded that the "abolition" 
of the right to silence under the Order may have increased the risk of innocent people being 
convicted. Owen Bowcott, UK: Amnesty Attacks Aboliticm of Right to Silence in Ulster Courts, 
Reuter Textline, Feb. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. This report 
further warned that the Order has "significantly diminished an essential component of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by international standards." Id.; see also Denis Campbell, UK: 
18 Jailed Irishmen 'May Be Innocent,' THE IRISH TiMES, July 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, 
Europe Library, Alleur File. 
236 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 ("that right is the hallmark of our democracy"). 
237 Galligan, supra note 37, at 88-89; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (privilege is justified because 
it respects "the inviolability of the human personality ... "). (citation omitted). 
238 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) ("By its very nature, the privilege is an 
intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and 
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation. "); see also Galligan, supra 
note 37, at 88-89. 
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defendant's mental thoughts, knowledge, feelings, and beliefs.239 
Critics ask why it would be a more serious intrusion to procure that 
information from the defendant himself.240 The answer, it seems, is 
one that links the privacy theory to fairness-requiring an individual 
to participate in his own personal downfall inexorably degrades the 
dignity of the individual. 241 Fair play under the accusatorial system 
requires that the State respect "the inviolability of the human per-
sonality" by according the criminal defendant an unqualified right 
to silence.242 
In addition to articulating more philosophically-oriented con-
cerns such as privacy and human dignity, "fairness" for the criminal 
defendant in this context also implicates procedural concerns. In 
the first place, a restored right to silence inevitably decreases the 
risk of false confessions, a procedural safeguard which clearly re-
duces the possibility of unfair convictions.243 Although, again, this 
position is not without its counter-arguments,244 it is likely that the 
use of adverse inferences actively discourages a suspect's use of 
silence during interrogation, thus concomitantly increasing the 
pressure to speak and risk misinterpretation or even manipulation 
at the hands of the police.245 Beyond reducing the risk of false 
confessions, an unqualified right to silence is immeasurably more 
239 Dolinko, supra note 228, at 1110. 
240 Id. 
241 MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFrH 32 (1980); see also Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and 
Se/fIncrimination, 80 ETHICS 87, 89-91 (1970). Gerstein sets out a compelling case for the 
privacy rationale behind the privilege against self-incrimination. He argues that although the 
guilty would seem to have far less of a moral claim to exclusive control over information 
regarding himself, the public admission of the private judgment of self-condemnation is a 
revelation of a peculiarly private character. Id. at 90-91; see also Couch, 409 U.S. at 327. This 
idea was eloquently expressed, Gerstein asserts, by Justice Fortas of the Supreme Court when 
he said: "a man may be punished, even put to death by the state; but ... he should not be 
made to prostrate himself before its majesty. Mea culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is 
a plea that cannot be extracted from free men by human authority." Id. (citing Abe Fortas, 
The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 1125 CLEV. B. ASS'N J. 91,98-100). Critics 
have dismissed such notions as substituting emotion for reason, because allegedly self-evident 
propositions are "the usual refuge of a judge who cannot articulate a satisfactory reason." 
Ellis, supra note 7, at 838 (citing Friendly, supra note 234, at 683). 
242 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 ("The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the 
respect a government-state or federal-must accord its citizens."). 
243 Greer, supra note 3, at 726. 
244 See Galligan, supra note 37, at 86. 
245Greer, supra note 3, at 726; see Dixon, supra note 207, at 247 ("Once initial suspicion 
has been established, the working practice of many police investigators is to confirm that 
suspicion and prove the suspect's involvement, not to seek to establish the truth. In such 
circumstances, many suspects are unable to deal with questioning and literally talk themselves 
into trouble."). 
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fair to the criminal defendant because it inherently recognizes that 
there are a host of "innocent" reasons why that defendant would 
choose to remain silent in interrogation or at trial. 246 Finally, the 
protected right to silence alleviates reliability concerns articulated 
by the "distrust of self-deprecatory statements."247 It can be argued 
that the right to silence as it is conceived here, similar to the Fifth 
Amendment "privilege" against self-incrimination, can be justified 
by its fundamental link to fairness concerns, concerns not unlike 
those captured by the U.S. notion of due process of law.248 
3. Verdict 
Parliament should rescind the Criminal Evidence (N.!.) Order 
1988 and implement a right to silence in both Northern Ireland and 
the rest of the United Kingdom. This right is necessary to protect 
the criminal defendant's invocation of silence from working against 
him at trial. At both common law and under the Order, adverse 
inferences are clearly drawn by the trier of fact from a defendant's 
silence in the face of police accusation as well as from the defen-
dant's refusal to testify. Although the Order authorizes and even 
encourages the direct drawing of adverse inferences in specific situ-
ations, an examination of the common law has made it clear that 
the Order is only accomplishing directly what was indirectly permis-
sible at common law. Such evidentiary consequences place an im-
permissible burden on a criminal defendant's exercise of his 
"right."249 Its practical effect, as the Supreme Court has noted, is to 
replace the right to silence with a duty to incriminate oneself.250 Such 
a dilemma has no place in the British system of criminal justice, 
which holds itself out as embodying "the tradition of scrupulous 
fairness to the accused. "251 
246 See Greer, supra note 3, at 727; EASTON, supra note 3, at 54. 
247 Ellis, supra note 7, at 843-44. Ellis notes that there may be compelling reasons to be 
wary of such statements-even a voluntary confession may be merely "an act of self-punish-
ment or self-abnegation" by an innocent man, rather than a "disclosure oftruth by one morally 
impelled to acknowledge his misdeeds." [d. at 844 (citation omitted). 
248 See Snyder, supra note 234, at 338 ("Although neither the commentators nor the Su-
preme Court has developed a comprehensive and precise definition of the concept of due 
process, most commentators and the Court have considered the idea of fairness to be 
dominant."). Moreover, commentators have noted that "[t]he American notion of due process 
of law grew out of a provision of the Magna Carta .... " [d. 
249 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 250 (1979) (Marshall,]. dissenting). 
250 [d. 
251 Van Kessel, supra note 51, at 7-8 (citing Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the 
Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1235 (1932)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The controversy over the implementation and impact of the 
Criminal Evidence (N.J.) Order 1988 upon the criminal suspect's 
right to silence is essentially misleading rhetoric.252 There is no rule 
at common law which prevents the drawing of adverse inferences 
from silence. Indeed, because such inferences are judicially permis-
sible the "right" tends to operate more like a "privilege" accorded 
in certain situations. Thus, the Order does not represent a substan-
tive change in the criminal evidence law of Northern Ireland. 
It indicates, however, that the United Kingdom affords the crimi-
nal suspect who declines to answer questions or testify at trial sub-
stantially less protection than that provided by the Fifth Amend-
ment. Because the right to be free from adverse inferences is 
essential in an accusatorial system of criminal justice, the right to 
252The controversy continued to be a burning issue in the wake of the Maxwell scandal of 
late 1991 and 1992. Ian and Kevin Maxwell, sons of the late publisher Robert Maxwell, were 
under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office in relation to their father's alleged mishan-
dling of corporate pension funds. See Silence in the House, THE TIMES (London) ,Jan. 14, 1992, 
availabl£ in LEXIS, Europe Library, A1lnws File. The brothers asserted their right to silence 
before the House of Commons Social Security Select Committee, in connection with the 
missing pension funds, and their assertion caused an uproar. Id. It also sparked an interesting 
debate between politicians, the bar, the press, and the public, in which competing notions of 
the right to silence have been bandied about See Duncan Heenan, Innocent Have No Need of 
Sil£nce, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, availabl£ in LEXIS, Europe Library, A1lnws File ("The 
so-called right to silence is claimed on the ground of avoiding incriminating oneself. How 
ridiculous! In a just society the guilty should be encouraged to incriminate themselves, and 
the innocent would not be able to do so by telling the truth."); Lord Hailsham, Bring Common 
Sense into the Courtroom, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 19, 1992, availabl£ in LEXIS, Europe 
Library, A1lnws File (author argues that "there are more sacred cows in our law of criminal 
evidence and procedure than would fill the Smithfield market in a decade ... this train of 
thought [has led to 1 ... almost ludicrous artificiality, complication, and want of logic ... "); 
Sil£nce Right Eroded in Law, THE TIMES (London),Jan. 14, 1992, availabl£ in LEXIS, Europe 
Library, A1lnws File ("Such a right, if it exists, is in the class of moral or natural rights, 
'inalienable' as the American constitution terms them, which idealists view as valid apart from 
their recognition by legislation, but which cynics dismiss (in Burke's famous phrase) as 
'nonsense on stilts."'). The controversy over whether the right to silence existed before 
Parliamentary committees reached the Court of Appeal, which ruled that it only applies in a 
limited manner because of the special powers given to liquidators under statute. See Maxwell's 
Son Loses Court Battl£ on Right to Sil£nce, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 1992, availabl£ in LEXIS, Europe 
Library, A1lnws File. The debate over the right to silence continued unabated into 1993. See, 
e.g., Right to Sil£nce, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 5, 1993, availabl£ in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni 
File; We Must Maintain Our Right to Sil£nce, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 1993, availabl£ in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Omni File (''This principle should not be thrown away for the sake of a few 
bad cases and political expediency. "); Freedom for Baby Death Parents Who Remain Sil£nt, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 1993, availabl£ in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. 
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silence in the United Kingdom should be reworked to protect that 
right. Currently, the right to silence in the United Kingdom, with or 
without the Criminal Evidence (N.!.) Order, is an unfortunate ex-
ample ofthe proposition that while the rhetoric oflegality may hold 
out certain rights, the reality of the law and its practice do not 
necessarily protect or include those rights.253 
Richard Maloney 
253 See Dixon, supra note 207, at 250-51 (citation omitted). 
